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The objective of this article is to examine Cyprus dispute and 
assess contributions of the UN and the process of integration into the 
EU to its solution. This article provides brief historical overview of 
the dispute and highlights key political obstacles towards reaching 
an agreement. Particular attention is paid to the impact of European 
integration on the the settlement processes as well as Annan 
initiative. The author finds that there wouldn’t be a sustainable 
solution for Cyprus without support to the proposals from its 
Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities.  
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Cyprus dispute has absorbed significant amount of time and 
reputation of the best diplomats and experts; however it remains 
unresolved and undermines European stability. This issue has grown 
in importance in light of the fact that Cyprus became EU member 
state, while it has a significant part of its territory occupied by 
another candidate state. The topicality of this research article is 
stipulated by the fact that unresolved Cyprus dispute undermines 
regional stability in region of the eastern Mediterranean and bares 
potential of the conflict between two NATO member countries. 
Frictions were experienced in the framework of NATO as well as in 
European integration of Turkey. The UN within its mandate 
undertook variety of efforts to negotiate solution and contributed 
significant amount of efforts for reconciliation of communities; 
however, it is yet to be reached.  
The research on the UN and the EU involvement in crafting 
solution for Cyprus conflict to date has tended to focus on the 
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shortcomings of the conflict resolution efforts rather than on the inner 
substance of the dispute in present time. Substantial attention to the 
problem was paid by Ukrainian and foreign researchers, particularly 
by Bose S., Christou G., Cilsal O., Diez T., Dodd C., Michalis M. 
and Yakinthou C. Specifically, Christou G. and Diez T. focused their 
research on the processes of European integration of Cyprus with the 
references to the dispute. However, due to the topicality of the issue 
further researches on this theme are in demand because of the 
necessity to provide timely updates with the latest developments as 
well as indicate assessment of the success achieved and shortcomings 
that need to be addressed.  
The objectives of this research are to assess critically UN and 
EU efforts in conflict resolution, examine their role in this process 
and study the role of European integration in the settlement. In light 
of the complexities of the issue it is assumed that UN and EU 
extensively addressing Cyprus dispute and despite failure to achieve 
reunification yet, they have made a significant constructive impact. 
In order to establish validity of the thesis this paper is divided 
into three main parts.  First, it gives a brief overview of the main 
historical events and causes that have led to the conflict and sustain it 
nowadays. It will then go to the critical analysis of the UN activities 
in conflict resolution, particularly analysis of Kofi Annan Plan. 
Finally, it will address European integration of Cyprus and its impact 
on the solution. 
With the aim to achieve objective of this research the author 
established the following tasks: to highlight main historical events 
that caused the conflict and sustain it up to nowadays, critically 
assess the role of the UN in conflict resolution, particularly Annan 
initiative, to study the impact of European integration on the conflict 
settlement and eventually explain the reasons that contributed to the 
failure of resolving the dispute.    
Over the history Cyprus attracted significant interests of the 
regional and global powers due to its geopolitical location. Cyprus 
became hostage of its neighbor interests, mainly Turkey and Greece, 
as well as Great Britain. Geostrategic location of Cyprus attracted the 
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interests of Great Britain, and by extension the USA as a strategic 
military outpost [8, 43].  
Antagonistic ethno-nationalistic sentiments of Cypriot 
communities are at the heart of the difficulties that impede solution of 
Cyprus dispute. The roots of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot 
nationalism were embedded to the idea of the anti-colonialism and 
the consequent unification with Turkey or Greece respectively.  
Strategic importance of Cyprus for Great Britain soared in 1955 after 
the Baghdad Pact, which was seen by British government as the 
means of maintaining its power in the Middle East, forming anti-
Soviet alliance and securing its interests in access to Suez Canal. 
Respectively, in 1955 Greek Cypriots developed guerrilla 
organization EOKA that was driven by anti-colonialism aspirations 
and the idea of unification with Greece (enosis). While British 
Middle East headquarters were relocated to Cyprus along with 
establishment of its military bases it faced anti-colonialism 
movement and confrontation with EOKA [16, 46]. In response to 
inter-communal violence and EOKAs insistence on the idea of 
enosis, in 1956 there was established Turkish guerrilla group 
‘Volkan’ with the aim to protect Turkish Cypriots. In 1957 it was 
replaced by the organization TMT. Other parties in face of Turkey 
and Greece were introduced to the conflict. Such development 
marked new epoch of Cyprus modern history replete with strong 
ethno-nationalistic sentiments, chauvinism and xenophobia 
culminated in inimical separation of communities that lasts till 
nowadays.   
After 35 years of British Colony Rule, in 1960 Cyprus achieved 
its independence as a result of violent uprising of Greek Cypriots 
against Great Britain. Cyprus’ constitution envisaged proportional 
principle of governance between two communities and allowed Great 
Britain to remain its military bases. In addition, a Treaty of Guarantee 
allowed Greece, Turkey or Great Britain to act jointly or individually 
to fight any threat to the constitution [8, 43]. Political leaders in new 
government were elected from the   extremist separatists from EOKA 
and TMT, and eventually acquired domestic and international 
legitimacy. Consequently, in 1963 inter-communal tensions erupted 
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that further escalated into civil war that persisted until Cyprus’s de 
facto partition in 1974 [16, 50]. UN responded to this threat with 
Resolution 186 (1964) which mandated its peacekeeping troops 
(UNFICYP) [12, 4].  
Consequently, cope of July 1974 plotted by Greek military 
junta took place with the objective to overthrow the president [5, 69]. 
Following these developments Turkey invoked the 1960 Treaty of 
Guarantee and occupied approximately 40 percent of the islands 
territory. Such actions resulted in approximately 160-200 thousand of 
Greek Cypriots fleeing occupied by Turkey territory, and 60-65 
thousand of Turkish Cypriots moving into newly occupied territory 
[8, 43-44]. UN Security Council in its resolution 360 (1974) “records 
its formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken 
against the Republic of Cyprus” [13, 1]. However, Turkey refused to 
withdraw its forces and in the following years facilitated move of 
over 40 thousand settlers from Anatolian Peninsular [8, 44]. In 1975 
independence of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed 
(from 1983 Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC), which 
enjoyed recognition solely by Turkey and faced international 
isolation. In such a way was shaped ‘intractable conflict’ which 
within itself presents a challenge to conflict resolution capacity of the 
UN [5, 64].  
 Over the years inability to negotiate a solution created a 
stalemate situation which required change in the dynamics of the 
approach to the problem. In absence of internal impetus and elite’s 
will to break the stalemate, an external stimulus was required. 
Aspiration of Cyprus to join EU was that very external impetus that 
was intended to be used in order to attempt brokering an agreement 
between communities in new circumstances. Particularly, the UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan attached his name and prestige to the 
initiative to negotiate solution for the dispute. Kofi Annan developed 
five versions of unification proposal plan before submitting the final 
for the referendum in 2004.  
EU Luxembourg Summit of 1997 resulted in decision to open 
accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus and the next year 
the UN extensively renews its peacekeeping role. Greece threatened 
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to use its veto right to halt the accession of all ten acceding countries 
in case of Cyprus’ accession denial [16, 134]. European Council 
summit in Helsinki in 1999 resulted in decision of allowing the 
Republic of Cyprus to join in the EU regardless of the conflict’s 
resolution [16, 98]. G8 Summit in 1999 provided diplomatic 
momentum for Annan Initiative by “urgeing the UN Security-General 
to invite the leaders of both parties to enter comprehensive 
negotiations without pre-conditions” [4].  
Final Annan Plan envisaged creation of a new federal state 
called United Cyprus Republic. It also suggested that federal state 
would comprise two equal constituent states Greek Cypriot 
Constituent State and Turkish Cypriot Constituent State. The model 
of UCR proposed by Plan followed consociational principles. Federal 
government had specified powers outlined by constitution, while 
constituent states had within themselves magnitude of powers 
regulating ordinary matters of daily life. UN plan provided balanced 
model establishing the principle of cooperation including 
“companion concepts that no decision could be taken by persons 
from one constituent state alone and that no single person could veto 
decisions or block the running of the state run like a golden thread 
throughout the plan” [11, 19]. However, the veto was embedded in 
the plan and “institutionalised in the senate level, and a series of 
complex deadlock-breaking mechanisms means that the veto does not 
reach the executive, therefore quelling Greek Cypriot fear that 
minority veto will again cause the paralysis of the state” [16, 79]. 
Executive branch would consist of Presidential council, Federal 
Administration and Federal Police. Presidential Council was 
supposed to adopt decisions by consensus or by simple majority 
(depending on the issue) and should consist of 9 members elected by 
senators with a clear majority. President of the Council is to be both 
head of the state and head of the government. President and vice-
president of the Council would rotate on a 20-month basis from 
Greek Cypriot to Turkish Cypriot [15, 32]. Rotation of the 
presidential and vice-presidents positions between representatives of 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community along with consensus 
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based decisions were designed with the thought in mind to “underline 
political equality and prevent any domination” [14, 18]. 
Federal Parliament would consist of Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies. Senate would consist of 24 members filled by equal 
number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Each Chamber of 
deputies would consist of 48 representative composed in proportion 
to persons holding internal constituent state citizenship. Minimum of 
25 percent of deputies were to hold Turkish Cypriot citizenship and 
maximum of 75 percent of deputies to hold Greek Cypriot State 
citizenship. Federal legislature would enjoy the powers of approval of 
international treaties for ratification, elect and oversee the functioning 
of the Presidential Council, adoption of federal budget and referral of 
serious crimes by members of the presidential council to the Supreme 
Court [14, 30]. There was to be no hierarchy between federal and 
constituent state laws. Independent institutions were to be Central 
Bank, Office of the Attorney General and Office of the Auditor 
General.  
Constituent states would have their executive and legislative 
branches. Turkish Cypriot Constituent State executive branch would 
consist of popularly elected president (head of the state), prime-
minister and council of Ministers. Legislative branch would be 
represented by Assembly of the Turkish Cypriot State comprised of 
50 popularly elected deputies. Greek Cypriot Constituent State 
executive branch would be represented by popularly elected president 
(head of government) and council of Ministers. Legislative branch 
would be represented by House of Representatives comprised of 60 
members.  
According to Annan Plan Federal state would include 
executive, legislature, judiciary and independent institutions. External 
relations, relations with EU, federal finances, operation of Central 
Bank, natural resources, aviation, navigation, communication, 
territorial waters of UCR, combating terrorism and organized crime, 
amnesties and pardons, intellectual property, Cypriot citizenship and 
antiquities would be within competencies and functions of federal 
state [14, 23-24].   
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Constitutional engineers developed detailed blueprint for 
mutually suspicious communities. For decade these communities 
lived in mutually hostile attitudes towards each other and refused to 
recognize the other side as a political entity. Sound text of the 
proposal, which prevents ambiguities in its interpretation, addressed 
and removed significant causes of conflict between elites of 1960 
state. Powers were distributed in such way that “federal government 
was given a certain number of important functions, but none of which 
were likely to cause inter-ethnic tension” [16, 93].  
Nevertheless, elites in both communities have contributed much 
towards antagonistic attitudes towards each-other. In elite-driven 
society like Cypriot, fears along with ethnic prejudice were widely 
exploited in populist politics’ campaigns over decades. Therefore, 
elites were not willing to resort to power-sharing option. Negotiating 
of Annans’ Plan was locked within zero-sum paradigm and exposed 
substantial lack of trust.  In this regard, even back in 1994 the UN 
presented its initiative in a set of Confidence Building Measures, 
which included proposals for co-operation in the fields of journalism, 
commerce, education, sport, culture, environment, health and other 
activities; however they were deadlocked at the discussion stage.  
Opening of the checkpoints could have been used as a 
confidence-building or reconciliation efforts; however, just like in 
case of  Astromeritis-Zodia in 2005 it was used by both leaders as an 
opportunity to blame the other for lack of good will. The conflict 
attitude between communities sustained with commemoration of 
historical events that represent loss for one community and victory 
for the other. Until recently the communities were taught to hate the 
other side through suitable interpretation of history, and only in 2004 
Turkish Cypriots revised their history books while Greek Cypriots 
experienced two unsuccessful attempts [16, 110]. 
Despite adverse cultural premises for reconciliation developed 
over decades, Annan Plan served as a catalyst for radical change in 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In January 2003 a crowd estimated 
between 50 and 70 thousand of people protested in the streets of 
Nicosia with slogans stating: “[President] ‘Denktash, if you don’t 
have a pen, we have one’ (referring to his refusal to sign-off on the 
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Annan Plan), and continued to demand his resignation” [7, 164]. 
Although the referendum became the apex for the Turkish Cypriot 
“quiet” revolution, this was not the case for their compatriots in the 
south. Greek Cypriot elites remained silent until a few weeks before 
the referendum itself. Governing elite in Greek Cyprus labeled Annan 
Plan as unbalanced and unjust, particularly “‘all gain’ for the Turkish 
Cypriots, and ‘all loss’ for the Greek Cypriots” [16, 118]. 
Guarantee of the EU membership for Greek Cyprus eventually 
contributed to defeat of the UN plan since Greek Cypriot gained 
sufficient power in negotiation process which broke the balance 
between communities that were treated as equal. Power sharing 
option lost its value for the Greek Cypriots which represent majority 
of 77 percent against Turkish minority of 18 percent of population 
[9].  International recognition and advantages of EU membership 
empowered Greek Cypriots to diverge from option based on equality. 
EU accession treaty was signed by Republic of Cyprus on April, 16 
2003 and “any leverage the EU had to ensure Greek Cypriot elites 
continued to support the Annan Plan was removed” [16, 136]. The 
incentive of EU accession was perceived as an impetus to overcome a 
history of elite intransigence and lack of co-operation but “the 
incentive was misapplied and caused further division” [16, 141]. 
In September 2008, new UN-backed talks began between 
Presidents of North and South Cyprus. The UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon continues to facilitate solution and participated in 
tripartite meetings. January 2012 summit between leaders of 
Northern and Southern Cyprus held in New York ended up with 
limited progress. The central issues discussed were the election of the 
executive, the issue of property and citizenship. Parties agreed to 
continue their efforts in mastering the solution, and the UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki Moon, upon the success outlined in report of his 
Special Adviser on Cyprus Alexander Downer, expressed an intend 
to call a multilateral conference in late April or early May [10]. 
Cyprus’ EU presidency in the second half of 2012 could be another 
impetus to master solution for the dispute. If this opportunity is going 
to be used depends on political will of parties concerned.   
United Nations and European Union in quest of Cyprus dispute solution 
 108 
While conflict remains unresolved, it echoes in significant 
economic loss of parties concerned. According to the research of 
Cyprus Centre of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) resolution 
of Cyprus conflict would gain Turkey every year over EUR 17 billion 
(3,5% of its GDP) and Greece EUR 3 billion [3, 37]. Northern part of 
Cyprus would get chance to fight its economic stagnation and enjoy 
access to the benefits of EU membership.  
Having concluded this research and returning to the question 
posed in the beginning of this study the author can confirm that the 
UN undertook extensive action to find solution for Cyprus dispute. 
The UN used the momentum to break the ice of frozen conflict and 
used aspirations of Cypriot society to join EU as catalysis for 
negotiating solution. Annan Plan achieved genuine public debate 
regarding reconciliation between and within communities that have 
strong ethno-nationalistic sentiments, chauvinism and xenophobia. It 
also elaborated comprehensive solution plans that balanced interests 
of the communities. However, unconditional accession of Cyprus to 
EU did not contribute to the solution of the conflict.  
Failure to reach an agreement and refusal of Kofi Annan 
initiative on referendum reflected that Cypriot communities were not 
quite ready for the reconciliation after decades of confrontation. 
Unification of Cyprus in 2004 was more desired by external actors, 
particularly, Greece, Turkey, US, UK, EU and UN than by its own 
communities which remained almost completely isolated from each 
other until only recently. Reconciliation handed from above by 
anybody due to external interests could serve as a source of 
instability in a view of the fact that such solution could lack 
legitimacy within Cypriot society. Without strong support from both 
communities the problem will persist and radical elites will attempt to 
take advantage of it. Main success achieved by both UN and EU until 
now constitute outbreak of genuine debates within and between 
communities on reconciliation which are fundamental for reaching an 
agreement acceptable by both communities. 
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Мета статті полягає у дослідженні Кіпрського конфлікту 
та визначення внеску ООН та процесу євроінтеграції у його 
вирішення. У статті вивчаються головні історичні події 
конфлікту які зумовлюють політичні перепони його вирішення 
на сучасному етапі. Особливу увагу приділено впливу 
Європейської інтеграції на процес врегулювання конфлікту, а 
також ініціативи Плану Аннана. Автор доходить висновку, що 
без підтримки з боку турецько-кіпріотської та греко-
кіпріотської громад неможливо досягти надійного вирішення 
Кіпрського конфлікту. 
Ключові слова: конфлікт, рішення, ООН, ЄС, Кіпр, 
Туреччина, Греція, інтеграція. 
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Целью статьи является исследование Кипрского 
конфликта и оценки усилий ООН и ЕС, направленных на его 
решение. В статье определяются главные исторические 
события конфликта, которые препятствуют его решению. 
Особое внимание уделено влиянию процесса Европейской 
интеграции Кипра на решение конфликта, а также инициатива 
плана Аннана. Автор приходит к выводу, что невозможно 
достичь надежного решения конфликта без поддержки такого 
решения со стороны греко-киприотской и турко-киприотской 
общин. 
Ключевые слова: конфликт, решение, ООН, ЕС, Кипр, 
Турция, Греция, интеграция.  
 
